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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
EVIDENCE - ADMISsIBLE FOR ONE PUrIoSE, INADMISSiBLE FOR
ANOTER - LIMITATION OF EFFECT. - In an action on an insur-
ance policy plaintiff introduced in evidence a card mailed plaintiff
by defendant insurer, referring to payment of ten dollars on "your
recent claim". In the presence of the jury, defendant objected, on
the ground that waiver had not been pleaded specially, as required
by statute1 and plaintiff stated that he thought the evidence proper
to show the balance due on the policy. Defendant never sought, by
instruction or otherwise, to limit the effect of the evidence to the
issue of the balance due. At the conclusion of the evidence defend-
ant moved to strike the testimony as to payment. In overruling
the motion, the trial court remarked, "I think it can go in for what
it is worth, not in particular as a waiver of defenses." Defendant
claimed prejudicial error in that this statement was not in the
presence of the jury, who knew of no limitation as to the purpose
of the evidence. Held, the objection and answer in their presence
sufficiently apprised the jury of the limitation so that they could
not have been misled as to the purpose of the evidence to the pre-
judice of defendant. LeftwicL v. Irter-Ocean Casualty Co.'
Evidence admissible for one purpose, but inadmissible for
others, is generally admitted even though the jury possibly may
use it erroneously for the wrong purpose.3 unless the risk of con-
fusion exceeds the advantage of using it.4 However, the court upon
proper application should limit the effect of the evidence by ade-
quate instruction.5 Such instruction suffices to limit the effect of
the evidence.0 By the better opinion, the opponent of the evidence
must ask for the instruction or he will be deemed to waive it as
unnecessary for his protection.7
1W . VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) e. 56, art. 4, § 22.
2 17 S. E. (2d) 209 (W. Va. 1941).
3 Mankin v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 373, 60 S. E. 248 (1908) ; Sprinkle v. Davis,
111 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); State v. Volpe, 113 Conn. 288, 155 Atl.
223 (1931); Curtin v. Benjamin, 305 Mass. 489, 26 N. E. (2d) 354 (1940);
Hubbard v. Allyn, 200 Mass. 166, 86 N. E. 356 (1908); People v. Doyle, 21
Mich. 221 (1870); (1939) 20 Am. Jun. 253; 1 WIGoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1940) § 13.
4 Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22, 78 L. Ed. 196 (1933);
20 Am. JuR. 253.
5 Sprinkle v. Davis, 111 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); Bourne v. Bourne,
185 Pac. 489 (Cal. App. 1919) ; Salistean v. State, 115 Neb. 838, 215 N. W. 107
(1927) ; Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N. E. 647 (1922) ; 20 Am. Jun.
253; 14 R. C. L. 791; 26 R. C. L. 1033.
G Sprinkle v. Davis, 111 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); 1 WIGMiORE, Evi-
DENCE § 13.
7Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 Pae. 251 (1920); Pegg v. Warford, 7
Md. 582 (1855); Commonwealth v. Feci, 235 Mass. 562, 127 N. E. 602 (1920);
St. Louis v. Worthington, 331 Mo. 182, 52 S. W. (2d) 1003 (1932); 1 WiG-
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Judge Kenna concurred in the result, in the instant case, be-
cause defendant alone, not plaintiff or the court, had the duty to
limit the effect of the evidence, and he failed to ask for an instruc-
tion, the general objection alone not barring the evidence since
it was admissible to show the balance due. He did not argue how-
ever that the colloquy between the trial judge and the attorneys
as to the purpose of the evidence prevented the jury's being mis-
led, but asserted that such a proposition is "a wide departure from
well settled principles of jury deliberation and that if followed
hereafter, the consequence will be quite confusing." 8
The jury may occasionally but frequently and indeed usually,
it does not understand the effect of objections and statements of
attorneys. It depends upon the court's instructions to learn the
effect of the claims and arguments of counsel. No authority has
been cited or found in support of the majority opinion that ob-
jections and statements of counsel may sufficiently apprise the
jury as to the effect of evidence. It is submitted that the approach
of the concurring opinion is more reasonable than that of the ma-
jority opinion.
HI. L. W., JR.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE - NONSUIT AFTER MOTION TO DIRECT A
VERDICT. - Issue was joined on a plea of "not guilty" in an action
of trespass on the case, and a jury was impaneled to try the case.
After the plaintiff had introduced his evidence, the court retired
to chambers where the defendant moved for a directed verdict.
Before the court directed the jury to return the verdict for the
defendant, but after it had sustained the motion, the plaintiff
moved for a nonsuit, but was denied. Held, that this was an error,
thus permitted a nonsuit to be taken after the court had sustained
a motion to direct. Lykens v. Jarrett.'
At common law a party could take a nonsuit at any time be-
fore the verdict.2 The West Virginia statute has limited the time for
a nonsuit,3 requiring it to be taken before the jury retires from
the bar. Where the case is heard by the court in lieu of a.jury,
this statute has been construed to mean that the nonsuit must be
moRE, EvmEiw-CE § 13. Contra: Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594
(1903).
8 Leftwich v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 17 S. E. (2d) 209, 213 (W. Va. 1941).
117 S. E. (2d) 328 (W. Va. 1941).
2 fDaube v. Kuppenheimer, 272 Ill. 350, 112 N. E. 61 (1916).
a W. VA. CODE (MAichie, 1937) c. 56, art. 6, § 25.
2
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